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Limitations on Workers
Bringing Third Party
Actions Under Section 58
of the Workers'
Compensation Act

by Matthew I. Lynn

he Court of Appeals of Maryland
in Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, I addressed the effect of the
statute of limitations, regarding claims of
employees against third parties, on the employer/employee relationship under § 58
of the Workers' Compensation Act. 2
The plaintiff, Smith, was a brick layer
employed by Bethlehem Steel Corporation
(Bethlehem) at its Sparrows Point, Maryland plant from 1948 to 1981. Smith discovered in March of 1979 that he had contracted asbestosis. 3 Mr. Smith had been
exposed to asbestos and products containing asbestos during his employment with
Bethlehem. Seeking recovery for injuries,
Smith and his wife filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of
Maryland in August 1981. 4 The Smiths
named fifteen defendants in their complaint including distributors and manufacturers of asbestos products, three physicians, and Bethlehem itself. Mr. Smith
contended that his asbestosis was caused
by "the deliberate intention of [Bethlehem]
to produce such injury.... "5
In March of 1982, Smith filed a claim
with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) 6 requesting benefits alleging occupational disease.
Smith then filed a request for a stay of the
proceedings in the workers' compensation
claim on June 8, 1982, on the ground that
th,e claim could be rendered moot depending on the outcome of the suit filed previously in federal court. 7
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In September of 1982, pursuant to a discovery order by the federal court, Bethlehem produced records which revealed the
involvement of Quigley Gompany, Kaiser
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, and
International Minerals and Chemical Corporation. These additional companies were
thought to have supplied products to Bethlehem which might have contained asbestos.
In November 1983, Smith amended his
federal court complaint to include the
aforementioned suppliers as additional defendants. 8 The newly named defendants
subsequently moved for summary judgment. They contended that the time within
which to file suit had expired with regard
to Smith's cause of action as against them. 9
Smith responded by contending that the
amended claims were not time barred, citing to the second paragraph of§ 58 of the
Workers' Compensation Act.IO The federal court, relying on the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, certified a
question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland to ascertain how paragraph two of
§ 58 affected limitations in third party
actions. II
The first paragraph of§ 58 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides that where
injury or death is caused under Circumstances creating a legal liability in a third
party to pay damages, the employee may
proceed against that third party to recover damages, or against the employer for
compensation, or both in the case of joint
tortfeasors. If compensation is claimed,
awarded, or paid under this article, an
employer may enforce, for its benefit, the
liability of such other person. If an employer does not start proceedings to enforce the liability of such other person

within two months from the passage of an
award by the Commission, the injured employee may enforce the liability. 12
The second paragraph of§ 58, as amended
in 1985, addresses the tolling of the limitations period. 13 Unfortunately, there is no
legislative history which would assist in
ascertaining the legislative intent of the
second paragraph. 14 The paragraph provides:
When any employee has a right of
action under this section against a
third party, the period of limitations
for such action, as to such employee,
shall not begin to run until two months
after the first award of compensation
made to such employee under this article, and this section shall apply to
past and future rights of action under
this section. 15
The Smith court held that this amendment to § 58 tolled the unexpired period of
limitations against a third party tortfeasor,
during the two month period following an
award of workers' compensation benefits,
during which time the employer has the
exclusive right to file a civil action against
the third-party tortfeasor. 16 However, it is
not clear whether the court's decision in
Smith gives the plaintiff two additional
months beyond the statutorily defmed threeyear period 17 during which he may file
suit. The court did not indicate under what
circumstances the two month extension period would apply. This author believes
that the most reasonable interpretation of
Smith is that § 58 extends the limitation
period for an additional two month period
only in two instances. They are:
1) when the award of workers' compen-

sation benefits is made during the last two
months before the statute of limitations
runs out under § 5-101, and
2) during the two-month period within
which the employer still has the exclusive
right to bring such an action. IS
It is important to note that an action
brought by an employer under § 58 can
only be brought as a derivative action. The
employer's right to participate in such a
suit arises only when the injured employee
brings a workers' compensation claim. The
court's interpretation of § 58 requires that
the benefits be both "claimed and awarded
or paid" 19 before the claimant's employer
had standing to bring an action under that
statute. In addition, the employee has no
independent standing to bring a third party
action against the negligent tortfeasor. 20
Statutes of limitations have been described as remedial legislation that rest on
sound public policy.21 The reasoning behind the policy decision to limit the time
period within which a party may bring
legal action for an injury is to balance the
competing interests of the potential adversarial parties in addition to certain societal
interests. 22 On the one hand, there is a desire to grant to the potential plaintiff an
adequate period of time within which he
may, using reasonable diligence, pursue a
claim. On the other hand, a limitation
period assures a potential defendant that
there shall be a period of time beyond
which he will no longer be subject to the
uncertainty and risk which accompanies
potential liability.
[O]ne of the purposes ofsuch statutes
is to assure fairness to a potential defendant by providing a certain degree
of repose. This is accomplished by encouraging promptness in prosecuting
actions; suppressing stale or fraudulent
claims; avoiding inconvenience that
may stem from delay, such as loss of
evidence, fading of memories, and disappearance of witnesses; and . . . to
promote judicial economy. 23
The courts have held that statutes of
limitations should be strictly construed
to further the public policy which serves
as the basis for their enactment. 24 The
courts have refused to give such statutes a
strained construction which would result
in evading their effect. 25 In addition, it
has been held that statutes of limitations
have "[t]heir justification in necessity and
convenience rather than logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles." 26
Section 5-101 provides that "[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years
from the date it accrues unless another
provision of the Code provides a different
period of time within which an action shall

be commenced." 27 Therefore, unless there
is another applicable provision ofthe Code
which provides a different period of limitation, one who attempts to file a civil action at law more than three years from the
date it accrues will be barred. 2s
While § 5-101 provides that the statute
of limitation period expires three years
from the date when the cause of action accrues, one must look to case law to determine when a cause of action actually accrues. 29 In Maryland, the general rule is
that a cause of action "accrues" upon the
occurrence of the alleged wrongful conduct
of the tortfeasor. 30 However, several legislative and judicial exceptions to this rule
have been carved out; the most notable is
the "discovery rule" which is applicable to
all cases involving professional malpractice, latent diseases, faulty construction
and certain defamation actions. 3 I

"First, it willfurther
the primary purpose
of the statute of
limitations, namely
protecting potential
defendants from
stal e calms
. .. "
l ·

The decision of the court of appeals in

Smith implies that the second paragraph of
§ 58 would affect the period oflimitations
governed by § 5-101 in an action brought
by an employee against a third party tortfeasor. This would occur only in instances
where the three year limitation period mandated by § 5-101 would expire during the
two month period following the first award
of workers' compensation benefits. During
this period the employer has the exclusive
right to bring an action against the negligent tortfeasor. 32 If such factual circumstances are not present, then under Smith
there would be no reason for tolling the
statute of limitations for a two month
period after the award of workers' compensation benefits to the claimant. 33 In
such instances, limitations of actions would
be governed exclusively by § 5-101, and
the plaintiff would not have the additional
two month grace period within which to
file a claim under § 58.

After Smith an employee can no longer
file a workers' compensation claim immediately prior to the running of the limitations period and after receiving an award,
expect to have an additional three year limitations period before filing a § 58 action.
Article 101, § 39 operates concurrently
with the three-year statute of limitations
in any personal injury case as set forth in
§ 5-101. After Smith, the injured employee
will be unsuccessful in contending that the
statute oflimitations as set forth in § 5-101
does not commence running until after the
Workers' Compensation Commission has
made the first award of compensation to
such employee.
Under the ruling in Smith, notwithstanding the language of paragraph two of
§ 58, whenever a third-party cause of action
arises out ofan employee's work-related injury, the three-year statute of limitations
on such a claim begins to run from the date
the tortious conduct accrues. This is generally upon the occurrence of the alleged
wrong unless the discovery rule applies. In
situations similar to that in Smith where a
claimant discovers a latent development of
disease, the cause of action accrues under
§ 5-101 when the injury is discovered, or
through the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence should have discovered the nature and cause of the injury.
The effect ofSmith will be twofold. First,
it will further the primary purpose of the
statute of limitations, namely, protecting
potential defendants against stale claims
brought after the expiration of the time in
which a person of ordinary diligence would
have brought an action. The rationale for
this objective is to give assurance to the defendant that he will not be liable for an indeterminable length of time for any tortious
conduct he may have committed. The second effect of Smith will be to promote judicial economy by encouraging promptness
in instituting § 58 claims.
It appears that the court in Smith intended the statute oflimitations for the filing of an action against a third-party defendant to be tolled for only the two month
period following an award of workers'
compensation benefits to an injured worker
and only if the three year statute oflimitations expired during that two month period. The court will no doubt have to clarify Smith further in the future.
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